United States-mediated working-level talks between Ukraine and Russia are set to resume in Abu Dhabi on November 10 and 11, 2026, marking the first direct talks of their kind since February, and raising, once again, the question of whether a negotiation process that has repeatedly stalled can produce even a limited agreement. The talks are expected to involve Ukrainian and Russian working-level delegations, with the United States mediating, and United States envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are expected to take part for the American side. The resumption comes at a moment of intense fighting, diplomatic activity in Europe and continued attacks on civilian infrastructure, and it will be watched closely not only in Kyiv and Moscow but in European capitals that have insisted they must be part of any lasting settlement.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the agenda for the talks during a visit to Berlin on November 3, where he met German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. According to Zelensky’s account of the agenda, the Abu Dhabi discussions are expected to cover a ceasefire focused on energy and critical infrastructure, the unblocking of the Black Sea for grain and food exports, and the return of prisoners and other people held, with an all-for-all exchange described as an aspiration rather than a guaranteed outcome. Each of those items addresses a different dimension of the war: energy infrastructure affects heating, electricity and daily life for millions of Ukrainians as winter approaches; Black Sea shipping affects global food supplies and Ukraine’s export economy; and prisoner returns affect families on both sides who have waited months or years for news of relatives. A negotiation that makes progress on even one of those items would be significant, even if it falls short of a comprehensive peace settlement.
Security guarantees and a recovery and prosperity plan are also part of the wider framework surrounding the talks, according to Zelensky’s Berlin remarks. Security guarantees, in this context, refer to commitments from partners that would deter renewed aggression and give Ukraine confidence that a ceasefire would hold, while a recovery plan would address reconstruction, economic revival and the long-term prosperity of a country whose infrastructure, industry and housing have suffered extensive damage. Those broader questions are unlikely to be settled in two days of working-level talks, but they shape what the delegations can agree in Abu Dhabi: a limited ceasefire is easier to accept if the parties believe it is a step toward a more durable arrangement, and harder to accept if either side fears it will simply freeze the conflict without addressing its causes.
Chancellor Merz, speaking alongside Zelensky in Berlin, set out the European position in plain terms: Russia must show that it is serious about a ceasefire, and Europe must be part of the process. That second point has been a recurring theme in European diplomacy throughout the war. European leaders argue that any settlement affecting European security, borders and economic stability cannot be negotiated over their heads, and that Europe’s military, financial and political support for Ukraine gives it a legitimate seat at the table. The Abu Dhabi format, with the United States mediating between Ukrainian and Russian delegations, does not by itself resolve that question, and the coming days will show whether European concerns are addressed through parallel consultations, through a later stage of talks, or through pressure applied outside the negotiating room.
Ukraine Abu Dhabi talks agenda and the fighting behind them
The backdrop to the talks is grim. On November 3, Russia bombarded Ukraine’s power grid, according to Zelensky, who said the attack involved 289 drones, 17 ballistic missiles and 59 cruise missiles. Those figures are attributed to Zelensky and to Ukrainian reporting, and they illustrate the scale of the assault on energy infrastructure that the proposed ceasefire is meant to address. Attacks on power plants, substations and transmission lines do not only cause blackouts; they disrupt heating, water supply, hospitals and industry, and they force Ukraine to divert resources to repair and air defence that could otherwise support civilian life. If an energy ceasefire were agreed in Abu Dhabi, its first test would be whether such large-scale strikes stop, and whether both sides can verify compliance without each accusing the other of violations within days.
A separate and deeply distressing incident underlined the human cost of the war in the days before the talks. Ukrainian officials said that 33 people were killed on Monday in a strike on a school aid centre in Komyshuvakha, a claim that is attributed here to Ukrainian officials and not presented as independently verified fact. Moscow, for its part, said it had targeted military units, and claimed that up to 25 servicemen were killed, a claim that is likewise attributed to the Russian side and not presented as verified fact. The two accounts differ sharply, both about the nature of the target and about the casualties, and that gap illustrates why independent verification is so difficult in an active war zone, and why negotiations over civilian protection and infrastructure are so fraught. Readers should treat both claims as claims by the parties involved, pending further evidence from independent sources on the ground.
Another incident reported in the same period was a fire at the Yaroslavl refinery, claimed by the Russian side in its own reporting of events. Refinery fires and strikes on energy facilities on both sides have become a recurring feature of the war’s economic dimension, as each side seeks to degrade the other’s fuel, logistics and revenue. The Yaroslavl fire, like the strikes on Ukraine’s grid, forms part of the wider context in which the Abu Dhabi talks will take place: negotiators will sit down while attacks on energy infrastructure continue, and the question of whether a ceasefire can be agreed while such attacks are under way will be central to the credibility of any outcome.
The fact that these are the first direct talks since February gives the Abu Dhabi meeting symbolic weight, but working-level talks are, by design, more technical than summit meetings. Working-level delegations typically focus on the details of implementation: what counts as critical infrastructure, how a ceasefire would be monitored, which shipping routes would be opened and under what inspection regime, and how prisoner lists would be compiled and verified. Those details matter enormously, because a ceasefire that is vague about its scope or its verification mechanism is vulnerable to collapse at the first disputed incident. The presence of Witkoff and Kushner for the United States suggests that Washington sees the talks as a serious attempt to move from general statements of intent to workable text, even if the path from working-level agreement to a leaders-level endorsement remains long.
Zelensky’s decision to outline the agenda in Berlin, rather than waiting for Abu Dhabi, also served a diplomatic purpose. By presenting the agenda publicly alongside Merz, Zelensky signalled to European partners that Ukraine was entering the talks with clear priorities and with European support, and he gave Merz an opportunity to reinforce the message that Russia must demonstrate seriousness. That public framing can help build political backing for whatever emerges from Abu Dhabi, but it can also raise expectations that two days of technical talks may not meet. If the talks produce only a commitment to keep talking, or a narrow agreement on one item such as prisoner exchanges, some observers may judge that a disappointment, even if negotiators themselves see it as progress after months without direct contact.
The Black Sea question deserves particular attention because it connects the war in Ukraine to food security far beyond Europe. Before the war, Ukraine was a major exporter of grain and other food products through Black Sea ports, and disruptions to that trade raised prices and threatened supplies in countries dependent on imports. Unblocking the Black Sea for grain and food exports would therefore have benefits beyond Ukraine’s economy: it would ease pressure on global food markets, reassure import-dependent countries, and demonstrate that a limited agreement can deliver tangible benefits even before a broader peace is reached. At the same time, Black Sea shipping involves complex questions of naval security, inspection, insurance and port safety, all of which would need to be addressed in detail before commercial shipping could resume at scale.
Prisoner returns carry a different kind of weight. For families, the return of a relative is not an abstract diplomatic outcome but a personal reunion after months of uncertainty, and the aspiration of an all-for-all exchange reflects the hope that no one will be left behind in a partial deal. In practice, all-for-all exchanges are difficult to negotiate because the two sides hold different numbers of prisoners, classify detainees differently, and dispute the status of civilians, soldiers and other categories of people held. Working-level talks are well suited to that kind of detailed work, because they can compare lists, agree on verification procedures and set a timetable, but they also reveal disagreements that leaders’ statements tend to gloss over. Progress on prisoner returns, if it comes, would be a humanitarian achievement in its own right, regardless of what happens on the wider ceasefire agenda.
As November 10 approaches, the key questions for observers are straightforward. Will the delegations agree on an energy and critical-infrastructure ceasefire, and if so, how will it be defined and monitored? Will Black Sea shipping be unblocked, and under what conditions? Will prisoner returns move forward, and toward what scale? Will Russia demonstrate, in Merz’s phrase, that it is serious about a ceasefire, and will Europe be given a meaningful role in the process that follows? None of those questions can be answered before the talks begin, and none should be prejudged on the basis of past rounds that produced statements but no lasting settlement. What can be said now is that the resumption of direct talks after February, mediated by the United States and framed by Zelensky in Berlin, represents a renewed attempt to find a path out of a war that continues to kill civilians, damage infrastructure and disrupt global food supplies, and that the outcome in Abu Dhabi will be judged not by the fact of meeting, but by whether it changes conditions on the ground.
Sources
USN reviewed reporting from multiple outlets for this story. Read more from WIO News, Khaleej Times and Straits Times.