WASHINGTON — The Trump administration is preparing to deport more than 150 Afghan immigrants to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan through Pakistan, according to reporting published on October 30, 2026, in what would be one of the largest single expulsions of Afghans since the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. The plan, described by a United States official and by a coalition of veterans and advocacy groups, has not been publicly announced by the White House or by the Department of Homeland Security, which declined to confirm future removal operations, citing operational security. The first flight could leave as soon as Monday, November 2, according to the reports, giving lawyers and advocates only a weekend to seek court intervention for people they say could face persecution, imprisonment or worse if returned.
The reports centre on a group of Afghans detained in Louisiana. Shawn VanDiver, president of the San Diego-based advocacy group AfghanEvac, said at least 80 Afghans had recently been transferred to Louisiana from 34 immigration detention facilities across the United States. The New York Times, cited in the reporting, put the total number expected to be deported at more than 150, and said the group included relatives of people who helped the United States military, as well as at least one gay man, and other people who could face discrimination or persecution under Taliban rule. Court filings for one detainee were reported to show that he had been placed on the manifest of a specially chartered flight leaving Alexandria, Louisiana, during the first week of November.
The administration’s plan, as reported, depends on Pakistan. The United States has no diplomatic relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, so it cannot directly arrange deportations to Afghanistan itself. Instead, the detainees would be flown to Pakistan, and Pakistan would oversee their onward expulsion across the border into Afghanistan, officials described the arrangement as a deportation to Afghanistan in effect. That routing is central to the story, because it explains how an administration that does not recognise the Taliban government could still return people to territory the Taliban controls. Pakistan has itself expelled more than two million Afghan nationals to Afghanistan since 2023, according to the reporting, a scale that dwarfs the group now detained in Louisiana but that also illustrates the risks advocates say returnees face.
Who the reported group includes
The precise immigration status of every person in the reported group has not been publicly detailed, and USN will not claim a single status for all of them. What the reporting does establish is that many of those facing removal fled Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover and the American withdrawal in 2021, a period when tens of thousands of Afghans who had worked with American forces, with American organisations, or with the former Afghan government sought refuge in the United States. Some arrived through evacuation flights, some through humanitarian parole, and some through other immigration channels, and their cases have since moved through a complex and often slow system of asylum claims, special immigrant visa applications and temporary protections.
Advocates say that history is exactly why the reported plan is so alarming. People who assisted the United States, and their relatives, are among those the Taliban has previously targeted as collaborators, they argue, and a return to Afghanistan is not a return to an ordinary home country but a return to a government that has detained, punished and in some cases killed its perceived opponents. The inclusion, as reported, of at least one gay man adds a further layer of risk, because same-sex relationships are criminalised and severely punished under Taliban rule, and because gay Afghans have faced particular danger since 2021. Human Rights First and AfghanEvac were among the organisations that raised alarms about the potential consequences, warning that deportees could face imprisonment, torture or execution upon return.
The administration’s position, as conveyed through an anonymous senior official quoted by NBC News, was starkly different. That official was reported to have said that the administration’s position was that the individuals do not have status in the United States and therefore the White House did not greatly concern itself with what happened to them after removal. That remark, if accurately reported, captures the core of the policy dispute: whether a person’s lack of legal status in the United States ends the government’s responsibility to consider the danger they face on return, or whether American law and international protection principles require a more careful assessment before removal to a country controlled by a group the United States fought for twenty years.
It is important to be precise about the status of that remark. It was attributed to a senior official speaking anonymously, not issued as a formal White House statement, and it has not been confirmed on the record by the White House. The Department of Homeland Security, for its part, did not confirm the operation at all. That combination — detailed reporting from multiple outlets, anonymous official confirmation, and formal refusal to confirm — is common in immigration enforcement stories, where operations are often planned in private and disclosed only when they are under way. It also means that the plan should be described, as USN does here, as reported, not as officially announced, until the administration confirms it or a flight departs.
How the Louisiana detentions came together
The transfer of at least 80 Afghans to Louisiana from detention facilities in 34 locations suggests a deliberate consolidation ahead of a single operation, rather than a series of unrelated individual removals. Immigration and Customs Enforcement routinely moves detainees between facilities for operational reasons, including to assemble a charter flight, and advocates said the pattern here pointed in that direction. The reported Alexandria departure, in the first week of November, would fit that pattern: a single chartered flight, carrying a large group, routed through a third country because a direct return is not diplomatically possible.
Lawyers for some of the detainees have been working to identify who is on the manifest and to file emergency legal challenges. The reporting said the New York Times had pieced together the plan through interviews with lawyers for some detainees and with three officials who spoke anonymously because the policy is confidential, while Bloomberg had first reported parts of it. That sourcing matters for readers trying to judge the story: it rests on multiple officials and on legal documents, not on a single anonymous claim, but it has not yet been tested by an official announcement or by a court hearing in which the government would be required to state its position on the record.
The timing, days before the November 3 midterm elections, has also drawn attention, although USN has no evidence that the timing was chosen for electoral reasons and will not assert a motive that has not been established. Immigration enforcement has been a central theme of the Trump administration’s campaign message, and the president has repeatedly presented a hard line on removals as a promise kept to voters. At the same time, the administration has pursued deportations throughout its term, and a charter flight in early November could equally reflect operational scheduling rather than campaign timing. What can be said is that a large, high-profile removal of Afghans, including people connected to the American war effort, is likely to become a campaign issue whether or not it was intended as one, because it touches on two powerful narratives: enforcement of immigration law, and loyalty to wartime allies.
The wider immigration crackdown
The reported Afghan plan does not stand alone. Since returning to office, the Trump administration has suspended refugee admissions, including for Afghans who sought protection after the 2021 withdrawal, and has pursued third-country deportation arrangements, sending migrants to countries other than their countries of origin. Those policies mark a reversal of earlier efforts to provide refuge to Afghans fleeing Taliban rule and political instability, efforts that had bipartisan support in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal, when images of Afghans clinging to evacuation aircraft became a symbol of the war’s chaotic end.
The administration has defended its broader approach as a necessary enforcement of immigration law, arguing that people without legal status must be removed, that temporary protections should not become permanent residence by default, and that the United States cannot absorb unlimited numbers of arrivals. Supporters of that approach point to the strain on detention facilities, courts and public services, and argue that clear enforcement deters further unlawful entry. Critics argue that the Afghan case is different from ordinary immigration enforcement, because many of those affected came at American invitation, worked alongside American troops and diplomats, and were promised protection in return. Veterans’ organisations have been among the most vocal critics on this point, arguing that abandoning Afghan allies damages American credibility with future partners who might be asked to risk their lives alongside American forces.
That veterans’ argument has political weight that extends beyond immigration advocacy. In 2021, veterans’ groups, members of Congress from both parties, and former military commanders pressed the government to evacuate and resettle Afghan interpreters, drivers, guards and other local staff. The AfghanEvac coalition, which VanDiver leads, grew out of that effort. Its involvement in the current reporting is therefore significant: it is not a distant advocacy group commenting on a policy, but a network that has tracked individual Afghan cases since the withdrawal and that says it has direct knowledge of the detainees’ backgrounds. Its warning that the Louisiana group includes relatives of American helpers, if borne out in court filings, would make the reported operation difficult to present as a routine removal of people with no connection to the United States.
What return to Taliban Afghanistan would mean
Afghanistan under the Taliban is not a country to which the United States normally returns large numbers of people. The Taliban seized power in August 2021 as American forces withdrew, and has since imposed severe restrictions on women and girls, on education, on employment and on public life, while suppressing dissent and targeting former members of the Afghan security forces and government. The United Nations and human-rights organisations have documented detentions, extrajudicial killings and persecution of perceived opponents, although the scale and pattern of abuse are disputed in detail and vary by region and by the identity of the returnee.
For a returned Afghan, the risk is not abstract. A person who worked for the former government, for a foreign military, or for a foreign-funded organisation may be identifiable through employment records, through community knowledge, or through biometric and other data left behind during the withdrawal. A person who is gay, or who is perceived to be gay, faces a legal and social environment in which same-sex conduct is punishable by severe penalties. A person who fled as a child, or who has lived in the United States for several years, may have no home, family network or livelihood to return to in Afghanistan, and may be dependent on the very authorities that previously threatened them. Advocates argue that these factors should trigger protection assessments before any removal, and that a group removal through a third country risks bypassing those assessments.
The administration has not publicly addressed those specific risk claims for the Louisiana group, beyond the anonymous official’s reported remark and the department’s refusal to confirm the operation. That silence leaves an important question unanswered: has each person in the group received an individual assessment of the risk they face, including an opportunity to claim asylum or other protection, and have courts had a chance to review those assessments? If the answer is yes, the government will be able to present the operation as lawful enforcement following due process. If the answer is no, or if courts find that process was inadequate, the operation could be halted by emergency orders, as has happened with other large-scale removals during this administration.
The Pakistan route and its complications
Routing deportations through Pakistan adds a further layer of complexity. Pakistan is not a neutral transit point: it has its own fraught relationship with Afghan refugees, having expelled more than two million Afghans since 2023 in a campaign that drew criticism from the United Nations and from aid agencies. A person flown to Pakistan for onward expulsion to Afghanistan would therefore pass through a country that has itself been returning Afghans in large numbers, and would have limited opportunity, advocates say, to seek protection in Pakistan or to contact lawyers in the United States once the flight has departed.
The arrangement also raises questions about diplomatic assurances. The United States has no formal agreement with the Taliban that would govern the treatment of returnees, and it is unclear what, if any, assurances Pakistan has given or received about how the group will be handled at the border. The reporting does not detail such assurances, and USN will not invent them. What is clear is that the absence of diplomatic relations with the Taliban does not, in the administration’s reported plan, prevent a return in practice. It simply changes the route, from a direct flight to a flight through a third country that does have a border and a working relationship, however strained, with the Taliban authorities.
For Pakistan, the operation, if it proceeds, would be politically sensitive. Pakistan’s government has faced domestic pressure over Afghan refugees, international criticism over mass expulsions, and security concerns about cross-border militancy. Accepting a group of Afghans from the United States for onward expulsion would align Pakistan with American enforcement priorities, but it would also associate Islamabad with the fate of those returnees. Neither the Pakistani government nor the Taliban authorities have publicly commented on the reported plan in the reporting reviewed by USN, and their positions, if they emerge, will be an important part of the story.
What happens next
The most immediate question is whether the reported flight leaves on Monday, November 2, or is delayed by legal action. Lawyers for detainees often seek emergency stays from federal courts, arguing that removal would cause irreparable harm and that the government has not properly assessed protection claims. Courts can grant such stays within hours, and a single judge’s order can halt a charter flight. At the same time, the government can argue that the detainees have already had their cases heard, that their removal orders are final, and that courts should not second-guess enforcement decisions. The outcome will depend on the individual records of the people on the manifest, which have not been publicly released.
A second question is whether the administration will confirm the plan. A public statement would allow the White House to present its rationale, to specify how many people are involved and on what legal basis, and to answer the advocates’ claims about risk. Continued silence, by contrast, would leave the story resting on anonymous sourcing and advocacy claims, and would make it harder for the public to judge whether the operation is lawful, humane or wise. The Department of Homeland Security’s refusal to confirm future operations is standard practice for enforcement planning, but it sits uneasily with the scale of this reported operation and with the public interest in knowing whether wartime allies are being returned to Taliban rule.
A third question is political and long-term. If more than 150 Afghans are returned in a single operation, it would signal that no group, including people with ties to the American war effort, is exempt from the administration’s enforcement drive. That signal would be heard by veterans, by Afghan communities in the United States, and by foreign partners considering cooperation with American forces in future conflicts. If the operation is blocked, delayed or narrowed by courts, it would signal instead that protection assessments and judicial review still constrain even large-scale removals. Either way, the Louisiana detentions have already become a test of how the United States balances immigration enforcement against promises made during its longest war — and that test will not be settled by a single flight, whichever way it goes.
Sources
USN reviewed reporting from multiple outlets for this story. Read more from The Times of India, The Economic Times and Times Now.