Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Berlin on Tuesday 3 November 2026 for a visit that had not been announced in advance, for security reasons, and used a joint press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to make a central argument about the next stage of diplomacy: Europe must have a seat at the Ukraine peace table. The message was directed not only at Moscow, but also at Washington, where a renewed American effort to reach a negotiated end to the war has raised a fear in European capitals that a deal could be shaped without the continent that will have to live with its consequences.
Merz backed that argument in direct terms. He said European countries want and must take part in peace talks, because key issues in any settlement could not be resolved without them. He identified two of those issues by name: sanctions and the security architecture after the war. In his formulation, those are not side questions that can be settled later by others. They are European questions, because sanctions are largely European measures, and because any security arrangement for Ukraine will shape the security of its European neighbours for years.
The Berlin meeting took place at a crowded diplomatic moment. The following week, adviser-level talks involving Ukraine, the United States and Russia were scheduled in Abu Dhabi, noted here only as background to the Berlin discussion, and those talks are not the subject of this article. The Berlin event itself was about something different: whether Europe, as well as Ukraine, will be present when the terms of peace are decided, and what support Ukraine will need in 2027 to keep defending itself while diplomacy continues.
Europe seat at Ukraine peace table: why sanctions and security need Europe
Zelensky put the point in terms of membership and geography. He said the United States and Russia could not, by themselves, decide whether Ukraine would become a member state of the European Union, because that decision required the support of other countries, and all of those countries were in Europe. The argument was not presented as a criticism of American diplomacy in itself. It was presented as a limit on what any two countries can decide about a third country’s future, and about a continent’s future, without the countries most affected being in the room.
Merz made a parallel point about Ukraine itself. He said it was completely unacceptable for third countries to discuss Ukraine’s fate without involving Ukraine, and he added that if Ukraine was at the table, Europe would be there too. He applied the same logic to a specific upcoming event: if United States President Donald Trump were to invite Russian President Vladimir Putin to the December G20 summit in Miami, and if Ukraine were to be discussed there, then Ukraine must be the first topic of discussion and the Ukrainian president must be seated at the table. That G20 point was not a separate policy announcement. It was Merz’s example of the general rule he was defending: no discussion of Ukraine without Ukraine, and no settlement of European security without Europe.
The concern behind the Berlin statements has been building for months in European capitals. European leaders have feared that Washington could pursue a deal on terms that sideline Europe and disadvantage Ukraine, particularly if the focus narrows to a ceasefire in itself rather than to the guarantees that would make a ceasefire hold. A ceasefire without guarantees, in the view expressed by Merz and his partners, would not end the war. It would pause the shooting and leave open what would prevent a return to fighting. That is why the Berlin discussion kept returning to guarantees, not only to a halt in fighting.
Zelensky also stressed, according to reporting of the press conference, that there could be no stable, lasting peace if Europe did not take part in the negotiations in one way or another. He said he expected European representation at a future meeting at the level of heads of state and government, and that preparation for such a meeting should begin with the adviser-level contacts already planned. Merz said all sides understood that key issues could not be resolved without European participation. Whether that understanding translates into a formal European seat at a future negotiating table, or into a parallel European process that feeds into American-led talks, was not settled in Berlin. What was settled was the public position: Germany, as Europe’s largest economy and one of Ukraine’s largest supporters, would not accept a settlement made over Europe’s head.
The Berlin visit also included meetings beyond the chancellery. Zelensky said he was scheduled to meet Merz, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Bundestag President Julia Klockner, and to take part in the Berlin Security Conference. Diplomatic coordination, air defence and support for the energy sector were identified by Zelensky as the priorities for the day’s talks, before the wider questions of guarantees and funding were discussed with allies in Brussels and Berlin in the following days.
What Zelensky asked for: 70 billion euros of extra support for 2027
Alongside the argument about a seat at the table, Zelensky pressed a financial case that he has made to European leaders before. He has said Ukraine needs an additional 70 billion euros, reported as about 77.5 billion dollars, from European countries next year, in 2027. That figure was reported again in coverage of the Berlin visit, and it rests on a larger estimate Zelensky gave to European Union leaders in Brussels in October: that the war would cost Ukraine 155 billion euros in 2027, and that at least 70 billion euros more was needed from European partners for defence, for weapons and for the country’s resilience.
The request is best understood in the context of support already agreed. The European Union approved a 90 billion euro loan earlier in 2026 to help Ukraine until the end of 2027, but that loan was not designed, on its own, to close the whole gap for next year. European Council President Antonio Costa has said the European Union typically covers about two-thirds of Ukraine’s financial needs, and that the European Commission has been tasked with proposing specific solutions for the additional needs, with a decision expected in November. Other partners, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and Norway, have been mentioned in reporting as possible contributors to the remaining share, while the United States, which was Ukraine’s main donor under former President Joe Biden, has declined to take part in new aid programmes for Ukraine, according to reporting on the funding debate.
The funding question is not only about totals. It is about timing, and about what the money is for. In Berlin, the discussion focused on specific, immediate needs: ammunition for F-16 fighter jets, air defence systems and other ammunition, according to reporting of Merz’s account of the talks. Zelensky also pointed to air defence interceptors, including for American Patriot systems, as a priority for the winter, and to support for the energy sector as Russian strikes continued. A loan or grant that arrives after winter, or that cannot be spent on the weapons Ukraine needs most urgently, would not solve the problem Zelensky described, even if the headline figure looked sufficient.
There are also political limits inside Europe that the Berlin meeting did not hide. Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria have said they will not take part in a new loan package, although they have said they will not try to block other member states from providing it, according to reporting on the October summit. That means any 70 billion euro package would likely be built by a coalition of willing contributors rather than by unanimous European Union action, which makes the Coalition of the Willing as much a funding vehicle as a diplomatic format. The Berlin press conference did not announce a new funding decision. It restated the size of the gap and the urgency of closing it before the 2027 budget year begins.
For Germany, the funding case is linked to its own record. According to the German Finance Ministry, as reported in coverage of the Berlin visit, Berlin had provided or earmarked about 57.6 billion euros in military assistance and more than 43.3 billion euros in civilian support since the full-scale invasion began, up to 30 June 2026. Those figures show why Germany’s voice carries weight in the funding debate, and also why Merz could speak in Berlin about continued German support with a record behind him, rather than only a promise for the future.
Coalition of the Willing meeting on 19 November in Berlin
The most concrete diary item to emerge from the Berlin visit was a date. Merz announced that a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing, the group of countries backing Ukraine’s security guarantees, would be held in Berlin on 19 November, bringing together the leaders of Ukraine’s key allies. The announcement matters because it gives the diplomatic process a near-term anchor: a meeting at which the wider group of supporters can discuss guarantees, funding and coordination, rather than leaving those questions to bilateral talks alone. Zelensky’s argument in Berlin was, in part, that such a meeting should not be a substitute for a European seat at a future peace negotiation, but a step towards it, a place where European positions can be aligned before they are tested in talks with the United States and Russia.
The Coalition of the Willing was formed in early 2025, led by the United Kingdom and France, to coordinate support for Ukraine and to plan for security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire. Its meetings have brought together leaders from more than 30 countries, including European states, Canada, Australia and Japan, alongside the European Union and NATO leadership. That breadth is part of its strength and part of its difficulty: a group that large can signal political support and pool resources, but it must also reconcile different national positions on how far guarantees should go, and on who would contribute troops, equipment or funding to enforce them.
In Berlin, the focus was on the political message as much as on the military detail. Merz said the meeting would allow allies to discuss how to support Ukraine in the months ahead, and to prepare for the possibility that peace talks, if they advanced, would require European backing to be credible. For Zelensky, the value of a 19 November meeting is that it keeps the European conversation going in public, at leader level, at a moment when American-led diplomacy could otherwise dominate the headlines. It also provides a forum in which the funding gap for 2027 can be addressed collectively, rather than through a series of separate bilateral pledges that may not add up to the total Ukraine says it needs.
The Berlin visit, taken as a whole, therefore had two tracks that were presented as inseparable. The first was representation: Europe must be present when peace terms are set, because sanctions and security guarantees are European questions and because a settlement made without Europe would lack legitimacy and durability. The second was resources: Ukraine needs a further 70 billion euros from European partners in 2027, on top of the loan already agreed, to sustain its defence through the winter and into the next budget year. Neither track, on its own, was presented as sufficient. A seat at the table without the means to keep fighting while talks continue would leave Ukraine negotiating from weakness. Money without a seat would leave Europe paying for a settlement it had not shaped.
Whether that combined argument succeeds will depend on events in the weeks after Berlin. The adviser-level talks in Abu Dhabi, the Coalition of the Willing meeting on 19 November, and the expected European Commission proposals on funding in November will all test whether the Berlin position, Germany’s backing for a European role and the 70 billion euro figure, can be turned into decisions rather than statements. For now, the Berlin visit has clarified the terms on which Ukraine and Germany are asking Europe to be judged: not by whether a ceasefire is announced, but by whether Europe is in the room when its terms are written, and whether Ukraine has the support to hold the line until those terms are fair.
Brussels meeting on security guarantees on 4 November
That test begins almost immediately. The day after the Berlin visit, on Wednesday 4 November, a meeting was scheduled in Brussels involving senior officials from the European Union, the United Kingdom, NATO and Ukraine, to discuss the security guarantees that would be central to any settlement. The meeting was described in advance reporting as a gathering of national security advisers and other senior officials, and it was expected to address the practical questions that a ceasefire alone would leave open: what guarantees would be offered to Ukraine, who would provide them, and how they would be enforced if fighting resumed.
The Brussels meeting matters for the Berlin argument in two ways. First, it is a European-led forum, in the sense that it brings together the European institutions and allies that would have to underwrite any guarantees, rather than a bilateral American-Russian discussion. Second, it takes place before the Coalition of the Willing leaders’ meeting on 19 November, so it can prepare the ground for that higher-level discussion. If the Brussels meeting produces a clearer shared position on guarantees, the Berlin meeting will have more to work with. If it exposes divisions, those divisions will be visible before leaders meet, and will need to be addressed there.
For Zelensky, the sequence of Berlin on 3 November, Brussels on 4 November and the Coalition of the Willing on 19 November forms a single arc: a public demand for a European seat, a technical discussion of what guarantees would mean, and a leader-level meeting to align positions and funding. That arc does not, by itself, guarantee a seat at a future peace table, nor does it guarantee the 70 billion euros for 2027. But it does give European leaders a timetable and a set of forums in which to move from statements of support to decisions that can be presented, in any future negotiation, as a European position rather than a collection of national views. Whether Washington and Moscow accept that position as a necessary part of a settlement remains the open question that Berlin, Brussels and the 19 November meeting are all designed to answer.
What Merz said about Russia and serious negotiations
Merz also used the Berlin press conference to set out Germany’s view of Russia’s intentions, in terms that were sharper than the diplomatic language of guarantees and funding. He said Russia did not want peace and was not conducting serious negotiations, and he argued that Moscow’s actions, continued strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian areas, showed a lack of willingness to end the war on terms that could be trusted. That assessment, if accepted by allies, has a direct consequence for the peace process: negotiations cannot be treated as if both sides were equally ready for a settlement, and any ceasefire proposal must be tested against what Russia does, not only what it says.
Zelensky made a related point about the conditions for talks. He has consistently argued that Ukraine cannot negotiate from a position where its energy system is being destroyed and its cities are under attack, and that continued military support is therefore not an alternative to diplomacy but a precondition for it. In Berlin, that argument was linked to the winter ahead: air defence and energy support were presented not as general assistance, but as the specific help needed to keep Ukraine functioning through a winter in which Russian strikes on energy infrastructure are expected to continue. A peace process that ignored that reality, in Zelensky’s account, would ask Ukraine to negotiate while its ability to survive the winter was being undermined.
Merz’s comments on Russia also served a political purpose in Germany and in Europe. By stating plainly that Russia was not negotiating seriously, he pushed back against any suggestion that the obstacle to peace was Ukrainian reluctance, and he framed continued German and European support as a response to Russian behaviour rather than as an open-ended commitment. That framing matters for domestic politics in Germany, where support for Ukraine remains strong but where questions about the cost and duration of assistance are part of the public debate. It also matters for the Coalition of the Willing, because a shared assessment of Russia’s intentions is a precondition for agreeing on guarantees that are designed to deter a return to war, rather than simply to pause it.
The Berlin visit ended, therefore, not with a peace deal, but with a clearer statement of the conditions under which Ukraine and Germany believe a deal could be reached. Europe must be at the table, because sanctions and security are European questions. Ukraine must have the funding to sustain its defence in 2027, including the additional 70 billion euros from European partners. And any negotiation must be judged against Russia’s actions, not only against the fact that talks are taking place. Those three conditions, repeated by Zelensky and Merz in Berlin, will be the test applied to the Brussels meeting on 4 November, to the Coalition of the Willing meeting on 19 November, and to any American-led talks that follow. If they are met, the Berlin visit will be remembered as the moment Europe insisted on a seat. If they are not, it will be remembered as a warning that was not heeded.
Sources
USN reviewed reporting from multiple outlets for this story. Read more from Al Jazeera, Ukrinform and Ukrainska Pravda.